The role of Tactical Groups and Corps in the Armed Forces

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Army experienced a rapid expansion, with thousands of new units formed, including battalions, regiments, and brigades. This unprecedented growth created a significant challenge for military command, as Operational Commands were no longer able to effectively fulfill their roles. As a result, an intermediate command structure was urgently needed to bridge the gap between brigade-level commands and the Command of the Ground Forces of Ukraine.

In 2014, following the invasion of Donbas by unmarked Russian forces, the Ukrainian Command established five operational sectors: A, B, C, D, and M. However, in 2016, these sectors were dissolved and replaced by three Operational Tactical Groups: Mariupol, Luhansk, and Donetsk. A year later, the Donetsk group was disbanded, while the remaining two were reorganized into Operational Tactical Group East and Operational Tactical Group North. This state persisted until the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Following the full-scale invasion, the Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine expanded its organizational structure by establishing several Operational Strategic Groups, Operational Tactical Groups, and Tactical Groups. These were introduced alongside the already existing Operational Commands to adapt to the evolving needs of the conflict.

Operational Tactical Groups (OTUs) and Operational Strategic Groups (OSUVs) are temporary military administrative bodies created specifically to command troops within combat zones and adjacent areas. These entities lack formal legal attributes such as correspondence addresses, contact details, or designated military unit numbers. Their structure is flexible, with authority limited to units operating within their respective zones of responsibility. In contrast, the established Operational Commands (OCs) focus on broader responsibilities, including the manning, training, and ensuring the combat readiness of their assigned units.

In simple terms, Operational Commands are responsible for preparing troops, while units deployed to a combat zone are transferred to an OTU or OSUV, which plan and coordinate their combat operations. This division often causes conflicts at both tactical and strategic levels. OTUs and OSUVs do not oversee the condition of the troops; they assign tasks based solely on operational needs, treating units as abstract entities on paper. When a unit loses its combat effectiveness, it is returned to its Operational Command for recovery and reorganization.

According to Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov, this has resulted in situations where a tactical group, commanded by an officer with the rank of colonel, was at times responsible for 22 brigades and dozens of separate battalions and companies.

In 2023, the Ukrainian command introduced another level of military hierarchy within the Armed Forces—the Army Corps. This move appeared to be a logical step toward a corps-division structure. However, the Ukrainian Army Corps do not operate as unified entities. Units assigned to them are dispersed across the entire frontline and come under the control of OTUs or OSUVs when deployed. Additionally, the semi-permanent nature of the Army Corps’ structure has resulted in an ineffective chain of command.

We can highlight this with the 100th Mechanized Brigade. Currently, the brigade is simultaneously under the command of three entities: the 9th Army Corps, Operational Command West, and OTU Luhansk, which is part of OSUV Khortytsia. As shown in the ORBAT below, the parallel chain of command is far from ideal.

Hopefully, this will improve with the introduction of a proper Corps-Brigade system, which is planned to be unveiled by the end of November.

The information in this article is based on details shared by Yuriy Butusov, Mykola Melnyk, and Konstantin Mashovets via their social media accounts.