Drapatyi Reflects on His Service as Commander of the Ground Forces

Mykhailo Drapatyi has summarized his six-month tenure as Commander of the Ground Forces. He resigned over the tragedy at the 239th Training Range Center, where a Russian strike killed soldiers from a training battalion on June 1. We provide a full English translation of his post, originally shared on his official Facebook page.

I served in the Command for half a year. For most of that time, I simultaneously performed the duties of the Commander of the “Khortytsia” Operational and Strategic Grouping of Troops, so I coordinated many processes remotely. I leave the position with a clear conscience — and with the hope that everything important we began will be continued and brought to completion.

At the time of my appointment, the Ground Forces Command was in a state of managerial stagnation. An atmosphere of fear, lack of initiative, closedness to feedback, indifference to personnel issues, superficial discipline, and a deep disconnect between the headquarters and the units. Systemic abuses, nepotistic appointments, and poor internal organization. There was not even a trace of a development-oriented spirit within the Command.

I worked to shift this system. In six months, nearly half of the leadership in key functional areas of the Command — those responsible for the effective formation and development of a modern army — was replaced. I leave behind a strong team — battle-hardened, proactive, and result-oriented. These are people unafraid to take responsibility, make decisions, and change approaches. They are capable of continuing the transformation we started.

The Command is gradually shifting from a culture of fear to a culture of responsibility. Decisions are being made not based on status or loyalty, but on analysis, results, and respect for subordinates. For the first time, bottom-up initiative has stopped being seen as a threat — and started being valued as a resource. Not all personnel changes were realized. The system continues to resist and prioritizes self-preservation over the interests of the country and the military.

MOBILIZATION AND TERRITORIAL CENTERS. One of the most painful areas. More than half of the leadership in the Territorial Recruitment Centers has been replaced. Within the Command, there are new personnel responsible for staffing and mobilization. A new results-oriented vertical is forming — not one aimed at simply “maintaining the process.”
At the same time, we’re working on a new model for Territorial Centers — open, fair, and free from corruption. Transparency, legitimacy, and respect for individuals must become the standard.

TRAINING. A structural overhaul of the combat training system has begun. The head of training and parts of the leadership have been replaced, some training centers cleaned out, and programs updated. The focus is not just on formal preparation but on real readiness for first combat. Tools for psychological support have been added, digital training management solutions introduced, and the material base of training centers is being upgraded. Basic combined-arms training in brigades is also developing. The work continues.

UAVs, EW, CYBER. New young leaders from the frontlines are now in charge. They’ve brought not only a vision for development but also a deep understanding of the real needs on the front — drones, munitions, components, training, and tactics. For the first time, the scaling of drone units is happening based on effectiveness, not loyalty. The new leaders have brought positive momentum. These units are developing systematically, based on actual frontline demands.

DIGITIZATION. Alongside other processes, the digital transformation of command has been launched. Both combat and support systems are being implemented — tailored to the needs of combat units, not suppliers’ interests. The principle is simple: no IT for the sake of IT — only what’s useful to the army.

LOGISTICS. A new team has begun reformatting the logistics division. We are moving away from the old model of “rear support for its own sake.”
Logistics command is becoming a service structure that supports the units. A modern logistics hub is being created, with digital tools and a new priority structure.

COMMUNICATION. We’ve started speaking to society and our personnel with respect, accuracy, and honesty. For the first time, systematic communication is based not on fear-mongering or moralizing, but on responsibility. The Ground Forces must speak with conviction — both internally and externally.

A systemic fight against corruption, conflicts of interest, and the selling of positions has been launched. First results are already visible. Resistance was expected, but efforts must be scaled up.

I don’t idealize the results. We could have done more. I could have done more. But I don’t regret a single day of this work. Everything I knew, could do, and had — I gave here.

The Ground Forces Command is only at the beginning of its transformation. Systems don’t change in a few months, but the direction is set, the team is in place, and the approaches have been revised.

I’m leaving not just a position — I’m leaving behind people and processes that have undeniably moved forward.

This is not the end. This is a transition to the next stage. With respect for everyone who fights, works, and holds the line. With faith in those who remain. And with responsibility for all that wasn’t finished.

We keep working. Until victory.