Invasion Day 605 – Summary
The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the recent developments on the battlefield, as of 21st October 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time).
Sloboda Front
includes the area of between Oskil and Aydar river
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Ivanivka, Kyslivka
Siverskyi Donets
overview map of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut and Lysychansk vicinity
- Russian forces made further small advancements in Serebryansky forest. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Bilohorivka, Vasyukivka
Bakhmut Front
includes the vicinity of Bakhmut
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Andriivka
Avdiivka Front
includes the vicinity of Avdiivka
- The invasion forces continue to launch attacks towards Stepove, hitting Ukrainian minefields and prepared defensive positions. Nevertheless, Russians made minor gains towards the industry area north of Avdiivka. (source)
- Ukrainian defenders launched a localized counter-attack south-west of Sieverne. It seems Ukrainian troops were able to regain control over the previously lost positions. (source)
- 59th Motorized Brigade repelled a Russian attack towards Pervomaiske. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Avdiivka, Keramik, Stepove, Tonenke, Pervomaiske
Donetsk Front
includes the center and southern part of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian forces bombed a bridge in Kostyantynivka, west of Novomykhailivka. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Prechystivka, Zolota Nyva, Staromayorske, Pryyutne
Zaporizhzhia Front
includes the Zaporizhzhia Oblast
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Left Bank Front
includes the left bank of Dnipro river between Kherson and Nova Kakhovka
- Russian suicide drone targeted Ukrainian troops in Krynky settlement, on the left side of Dnipro river. The video reveals Ukrainian presence in the settlement, thus making it contested. (source)
Due to ongoing raids in the area between Kherson and Nova Kakhovka, Left Bank Front has been introduced and Kalanchak Front retired.
Full map of Ukraine
overview map of current situation in Ukraine
This summary and detailed maps are based on the following sources:
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, official media channels of Ukrainian regional administrations, Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and geolocated footage.
We also thank the following Twitter users for their geolocations and amazing work: @neonhandrail, @auditor_ya and the team at @geoconfirmed.
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I wonder how much equipment Russia produces monthly, it would put all the equipment losses into perspective.
as much as they can… They have switched to a war economy, so almost all resources are being put into this area. In the medium term, however, this will become a problem. Citizens can no longer replace their defective washing machines, kitchen machines, etc. because nothing was produced. Unless they put tanks in the apartment.
There is no apparent militarisation of the economy. Military plants have been switched to round-the-clock operation. That’s all for now
its again sort of hybrid, investments were made, roughly 20% of the baseline but while money can flow, they lack additional men, so round the clock as you say. Plus certain technology leaving their production at rate, but less quality or more errors during production. Id recommend https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ctrtAwT2sgs, the fundament is there, while you can always question ciphers or detail.
The budget for 24 shows a very considerable increase for military spending. So the economy will be moved in the direction war economy some more.
Yes, the defence budget has gone up significantly. But! Transferring the economy to military means re-profiling factories to produce military products. Such an operation takes time. There are no preparations for it
From what I gather a upscaling is happening in munitions and drones, which are the most pressing issues. Concerning metal for the Frontline Russia has a lot more time and it may use some of the budget increase to start upscaling there next year. The next big problem are probably barrels. I think much of the increase will go into personal costs. Putin is obviously very reluctant to go on full war
footing economically. I think they will decide after US elections if they want to escalate economicaly further.
Thanks for the link! Really interesting and facts-based video.
dolboeb 4to-li?
So production wise not near enough to replace losses, but its an “ok” combination of using soviet stocks with new production- leaving them buffer for 1-2y. Depending on the speed of attrition Russia is moving forward. I was trying to post some numbers, but waiting for approval, not sure what word is violation of the filter-
prewar yearly: tanks 20 to 30 new, 180 to 250 modernized, 600 to 800 refitted from stock, Ka5215, MI28 units, BMPs – follow forbes hyperlink. SPG based on tank chassis, it would be similar to tanks 20 to 40, but was unable to find link. For special equipment like Radars and SAMs, big Ships, its almost irreplaceable.
prewar yearly: tanks 20 to 30 new, 180 to 250 modernized, 600 to 800 refitted from stock or Ka52 estimated 15 pcs a year
For special equipment like Radars and SAMs, big Ships, its almost irreplaceable.
Let’s put it like this, Russia will have some metal at the Frontline for ever. It will likely become less and the quality of those from stocks will go down. I would also guess that the more or less good stuff, like t 72s will be gone in 1-2 years. But It is a lot more important how the artillery, ammunition and drone side of things develops.
Concerning production of new or upgraded gear we have see some increase from 22 to 23 we see that t90s losses are more or less stable and upgraded tanks have changed to lower quality, due to sanctions. About the later it is hard to say how many came from stocks and which are upgraded. It all seems to fit a 24h/7d production increase with material restrains. Not sure if Russia will increase those
about 200 in 23/24:considerable. Things concerning those pulled out of stocks will get more complicated by the day. May be they can compensate by workshop increase.
If the war continues as it is currently, Russia will have tanks available for almost 5 years. The first year they lost so many tanks because they used 5 times as many. The Russians were in attack mode and were still of the opinion that a lot helps a lot. It was the same with artillery… But since the Russians can adapt quite quickly and are on defense anyway, far fewer tanks are now used.
But that doesn’t mean they don’t have any available anymore. They even have so much that they accept the possibility of losing 20 tanks in spontaneous offensive actions (Avdiivka…), even though they now know that these tactics are of no use in UKR. And if necessary, they get tanks from allied former Soviet states.
Given the sheer numbers of Russian equipment lost near Avdijivka, I’m afraid the Russians stocks are nowhere close to running out. Russia stays true to its quanitity over quality approach
No, tank and apv stocks will not run down for a long time. In question is the speed in which Russia can make them combat ready. Best quality will go out first and is easy to get ready, while Russia surely increases workshop shifts and quantity. Tank and APV losses went down from 22 to 23 and likely further in 24 and so on…
The degree of breakage on the battlefield is a completely unknown quantity.
there is whole level behind the scene fog of war element. Combat loss, production and repairs, but also breakage (eg in terms that tank, that was supposed to be on attack position next morning is not able to start its engine and must go back to repair base) and maintenance (where you eg have 3 tanks to repair but can work only on one)…and then we have crew quality and replacement.
they wont run out, but theyre on that path since its xy limit of production made in USSR, Russia alone has no chance to build. For tanks and SPG artillery is already estimated 30 to 50 stock empty, but even running out of stock tanks doesnt mean you cannot wage defensive war, dug yourself and fight for any inch you hold. As long as they have mines, arty, RPGs and will to fight.
Here some data points of what we know: 1) Russia is losing less tanks, so likely fielding less tanks than in 22. 2) Satellite image counts of stock bases show that the amount of tanks/apvs shrank considerably, like 20-30 percent. 3) Oryx loss statistics show that e.g. the 72 A variant is becoming more often and 72 B is shrinking.
Artillery is a different theme, since here the barrel wear is the
Problem. Satellite images show that stocked systems get their barrels removed. So the problem here is likely to replace the worn down barrels. Obviously this problem reduces if you have less ammunition to use to begin with.
Things to keep in mind concerning stocks: Depending on quality you need 2-4 Tanks to refit one tank. You will pull the best quality first, so that factor gets worse. You also use stocks for spare parts for tanks that are fielded. The wear and tear on Frontline Metall is very big. So stocks run down a lot quicker than the rough number implies.
Old soviet stocks of tanks/armored vehicules/artillery are at least half-depleated (according to satellite images). And what remains is older and/or inferior quality. So, they may not be “close to running out” yet, but they will eventually.
Quantity is NOT unlimited. And quality decreases every day with new losses.
But old tanks also come from A to B, can shoot and offer the occupants protection from shrapnel and gunfire. Let’s not overestimate the technology, but we shouldn’t underestimate the old things either. They do what is asked of them. The old devices are worth their weight in gold, especially in a war of attrition
I have the feeling UKR missile defence is failing more and more lately. Is this shared by other people on the platform? A few months ago UKR would intercept 90-100% of the missles, now more and more are getting through.
There is hardly a missile campaign right now. What do you refer to? Iskanders and S300 rockets were never really intercepted before and protecting city’s close to the Frontline like Kharkov, Zaporizhia, Odessa, etc. is difficult. If Russia would try to hit Kiew again, that would look differently. Russia will likely go mass and deep this winter again. Interception quotes will probably go up again.
But there is a concern that Ukraine will run low on interception missiles. That may become an issue as well. We will see.
exactly, city’s on the frontline seem to get hit a lot. Arent these the places that need air defences the most? Why is this so difficult to defend? And I was hoping the faster missiles like S300 could be intercepted by now (with the patriots for instance).
Not sure patriots can intercept s300 missiles, but even if they could, they would be to expensive to do it, let alone that Ukraine only has 2 systems in the country right now. No, the s300 problem stays, especially since Russia has a LOT of them. Iskanders is a different thing, but there are simply not enough systems that can shoot them down. No, the AD problem will stay.
aha, oke thanks
P.S.: the f16s will help concerning the cruise missiles once they are in Ukraine. They are a lot better in intercepting those, than the sovjet planes. Won’t help against the S300 or ballistic missiles (iskander) either though. And the s300 missiles are very unprecise and have a very short range.
Aren’t the s300/400 systems a serious threath to those F16s?
As I said, relatively short range, the f16s will operate out of the range of those and could help intercepting cruise missiles somewhere in the ukrainian sky.
depends of the version of airframe and more importantly: systems (that including software). Have in mind that RU does not sleep also, they modernise these systems as they can along the way. It is always a competitive run, and always was.
F16 just have to stay under the russian capacity of detection or interception.
Like ukrain do with soviet planes.
the plane is an element of a bigger structure. I do believe that Ukr can overcome most of the obstacles (it would be a lot better if they would be able to start a year ago) but no singular tech is a magic wand.
And if you imagine that you can stop ballistic missle in short range without superman’s sight and lasers in eyes, then good luck.
With who are you talking?
Oryx boosted KA52 losses, from 44 to 59, thats kinda wow effect. There were estimated 130 pre-war, with estimated 15 pcs in a year production.
Yes, those strikes are costly and will make the use of rotary’s more complicated for Russia. Very good news. One day we finally will allow them to use those weapons on Russia aswell, that will be a massacre. Still only the 150 km Variant. There is still some more good stuff down the line… To bad the most important bottleneck of artillery munitions will last till 25.
yep. I’d said the more the merrier. Copters are pain in the ass, often bigger than planes because they are used on lower level, which means: faster and in more agile way.
Pretty easy to hit with Stinger though. What the UA armed forces often showed in the first year of the war. They’re pretty dangerous when used remotely, it’s true. But Russia had the problem that many helicopter pilots refused to fly the things to the front?
We are not in Vietnam, where helicopters were one of the most important means of combat.
in the Nam they were important because that was an assymmetric war with generally technologically inferior opposition. They would be shoot like flies if the NV army had the means (typical for the time).
The main advantage of rotary asset is low level command. Unlike the planes (which 1stly has to be put in preplanned positions and route to be able to respond), rotary may be called –>
quickly from the company (maybe even platoon or squad in case of SOF) level. And while they are slow and prone to be in danger from land-based AA assets, they can be damn deadly. Especially newer assault ones.
I’m surprised that helicopters were never included or requested for western deliveries. Either Ukraine has enough or they don’t have pilots for it. The UKR should actually be aware of the advantages you listed. According to Oryx, UA lost 37 helicopters, including only one western one. Apparently they mostly see more advantages in drones
expensive, requires sophisticated logistics train and personnel. While they are kinda ‘tanks or trucks just flying’ they sometimes are as much expensive as airframes. Additionally, most armies does not have a lot of them.
Apparently the Russians have refrained from encircling Avdiivka for now, because they are now pushing in the opposite direction to the M-30.
The bombing of the Kostiantynivka bridge would destroy an important Ukrainian supply route to the south. It also makes defending Vuhledar more difficult because UA only come into the city from one side.
Krynky is interesting because from there the only road on the left bank of the Dnipro, on non-Russian territory, leads towards Oleshky. Oleshky must be recaptured to protect Kherson.
Refrained from encircling is a very nice way of putting it, after losing about a division of equipment.
The Ukrainian operations in the south are interesting. Seems like both sides try to do something special before mud season strikes. It feels strange to me to widen the bridgeheads just before it.
Apparently the mud season is very different in Donbas and Kherson. Ground tends to stay more solid in the south than east in autumn. It’s also been a relatively dry summer. As soon as the Dnipro rises to cover the new mud flats in the area, shuttling supplies and equipment becomes easier. Cloud cover will make it harder for the orcs to observe and hit targets.
Correct. There is already morning frost in Donbas, but nothing like that in the south.
In the south, ukrain win in both situations with only a small cost.
Russia have to take troops to another front to repulse ukrainian.
If russia didnt send troops , ukrain will just slowly take field and fortify their positions.
I think serious things will start in south when ukrain will liberate kiburn. What we see is just small distraction.
Is Kinburn actually cast properly? I believe this is a neutral zone. It is shown as RU occupation because the Russians control the borders to Kinburn. And there are no other access routes except the sea. Whoever controls the Kinburn border owns the peninsula without having to conquer anything there. There are hardly any roads, no settlements, just a nature reserve.
No russia control the peninsula. But ukrain have fire control on the road. Its a very favorable situation for ukrain.
I don’t know… On most maps Kinburn is shown in red, meaning it’s a Russian-occupied area. Certainly because it is on the eastern bank of the Dnipro, which is almost completely controlled by the Russians. But that is controversial, so in my opinion it is a neutral zone. Because north of Kinburn the coast is completely Ukrainian.
I also don’t believe that you can launch an offensive to the east (right of the Dnipro) from this peninsula because there are hardly any roads or built-up areas (for base camps). You can go ashore there by ship, but you cannot move large military equipment.
Actually, the maps should show this peninsula as Ukrainian because the Russians were never there.
if you think about IIWW realities then yes. A division. Singular. In modern terms it’s getting close to a corps in the hardware and around a regiment in declared personnel loses.
Yes, the losses are insane. Reminds me of the storys of my grandfather, with the Russians running frontally into MG-Nest positions wave after wave after wave. What a stupid waste of lifes for the dumb idea of an empire that never brought its citizens anything but suffering. It just underscores the ukrainian reasoning once more to get the hell out of that orbid no matter the costs.
One might think that the Russians have a choice. Between life in poverty, corruption and mismanagement. Or go to war, die and thereby help your family with a small government compensation.
Poor makes you stupid, otherwise the elite would never be able to have so much control over the citizens… The only way out is to drink yourself into a coma with vodka.
(2nd 1st waiting for approval)
–> we may cheerish and count enormous losses while the Walking Dead overwhelm the positions. So… pretty it is not.
em… why the destruction of a route which couldn’t be used anyway (enemy\s fire control and crossroad already taken) would damage Vuhledar supply route?
Pobieda and Novomykhailivka are (a bit) screwed, but that actually is their default state because of positioning.
Wasn’t that the 72nd Brigade’s supply route? If the 72nd is no longer there, then the Russians can control this road to Vuhledar more easily because from the east, through the destroyed bridge, the UA forces cannot advance on the road. And the Russians would have a good path towards Vuhledar.
im no expert and i understand its probably some 3rd grade road instead of 1st grade road from Kostyantinivka, but seem there is road from Bohoyavlenka to Vuhledar or to Vodyane and then connecting to main road from there. So seem supply should be manageable. If anyone knows more, feel free to explain it. Thanks
the road Vuhledar-Pobieda on which the bridge was blown is in the range of artillery, surveilance and drones for a long time. Even less useful since RU upgraded their drone usage around a year ago (took them a while). I doubt that there was any significant movement. Supply routes are going rather (I suppose) North towards unnamed settlements West of Kurakhove –>
–> because the idea that Vuhledar was supplied from Pobieda seems somewhat bonkers.
That maybe true, but Avdiivka and Bakhmut showed the supply is somewhat possible even under fire if youre willing to pay the price, thats why have speculated alternate routes if the bridge was critical for next few days (before smaller one next to it is built) and in case the road is used for supply.