The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the recent developments on the battlefield, as of 7th October 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time).
Sloboda Front
includes the area of between Oskil and Aydar river
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Synkivka, Ivanivka
Siverskyi Donets
overview map of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut and Lysychansk vicinity
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Makiivka
Bakhmut Front
includes the vicinity of Bakhmut
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Avdiivka Front
includes the vicinity of Avdiivka
- Russian troops advanced north of Krasnohorivka and reached the nearby railway once again. (source)
- The invasion forces advanced towards M-30 south of Avdiivka after months of failed attempts. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Avdiivka
Donetsk Front
includes the center and southern part of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian forces attempted to storm Ukrainian positions in Marinka, only revealing that the defenders control more of the settlement than we previously thought. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Vodyane, Novomykhailivka, Zolota Nyva
Zaporizhzhia Front
includes the Zaporizhzhia Oblast
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Kherson Front
includes the left bank of Dnipro river south of Kherson and Kakhovka
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Full map of Ukraine
overview map of current situation in Ukraine
This summary and detailed maps are based on the following sources:
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, official media channels of Ukrainian regional administrations, Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and geolocated footage.
We also thank the following Twitter users for their geolocations and amazing work: @neonhandrail, @auditor_ya and the team at @geoconfirmed.
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Mentioned Units |
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I’m glad Steve Scalise got nominated for speakership in the US House of Representatives. Washington Post gave him a B on his Ukraine report card – I think Ukraine will continue receiving US support, so finally some good news. He still needs to receive the votes
Hello!
Since a long time there were no news about the two Cherson bridgeheads. Do they still exist, is it like a calm „standby“ at the moment, with only artillery fighting?
And are there any news about the russians who fight for UA in Belgorod direction, conquering some villages for a few days some months ago, are they still alive?
(2. Question might be off-topic, but 1. please)
AFAIK, the Kherson bridgeheads still exist. No recent news from that part of the front.
Those Russians are still alive (AFAIK), they sometimes launch small attacks in Russia, but nothing spectacular.
There is currently a Russian offensive near Avdiivka. Difficult to understand its scale, objective and results. We’ll have to wait.
It feels like the Russians are somehow behind the war in Israel, in order to distract the west from Ukraine – they attacked Avdijivka now that most people aren’t looking at the Donbass. I hope the situation in Israel will also result in more financial and military support for Ukraine.
Apparently, it was quite big (several battalions). And a total failure for Russia.
Hi Jerome, thank you for posting these updates. I have been following for a long time and they are always very informative.
In your opinion, does Ukraine have a manpower shortage? If so, why is there no foreign recruiting effort to alleviate that?
Does the lack of on-paper map changes indicate Russia has “won” and achieved their objectives? What exactly is the Ukrainian goal at this point?
Hi, Ukraine has shortage of elite fighters at this moment. Manpower might become a problem next year, this is where russia has the upper hand. Foreigners can still join the International Legion.
The enemy hasn’t achieved any of its goals. Ukrainian mission continues to be the same, liberate all its occupied territories.
Why do you think ukrainian manpower may become a problem next year?
1) The amount of casualties, which is high – UA needs to mobilize ~10k to make up for the losses and leaves in already existing units – it’s not small number.
2) The longer the war is going, the more people are looking for excuses why not to serve (in August, lawyers complained they have to).
4) Various ministries have reserved thousands of people, which blocks faster expansion on UA forces.
Interesting. We may see Ukraine and Russia settling for a frozen or slow conflict sooner than I thought, if Ukraine actually cannot mobilize enough after 2 years. Would be interesting to have a look into the history books for e.g. gb in WW2. I kind of doubt that the british were happily getting mobilized after 2 years of war. If Ukraine wants to ‘win’, it will have to do it the long way.
I personally see 2 valid strategies for a ‘win’, settle in for a truce Korea style and win the peace German style there after or concentrate on keeping Russian costs as high as possible while minimizing yours and hope for western support to stay. Without the will to fight on and mobilize on, the later won’t work and forcing Russia into a stable truce won’t get easier either.
I think Ukraine understands that the will to fight and mobilize on is the only way and reading English Ukrainian press, it feels like Ukraine knows that, and it doesn’t like it, rightly so. It is deep shit but what other way is there? I don’t see it.
Hey!
Just for understanding:
Are „elite fighter“ the ones of the special units who are long-time serving experienced soldiers or count the ones trained in the last months in Europe as well?
And do you might know an actual number how many of the international fighters still fight for UA? Beside moved back/killed.
In this term the big „join time“ will sadly also not appear again or?
You can’t train special forces in 4 months. The UA special forces do not consist of mobilized soldiers, but rather experienced soldiers who have been fighting for UKR for years. Special forces do not fight on the front for long periods of time, but are intended for special missions. Reconnaissance, evacuation, infiltration, commando operations.
Thanks Kay!
please everyday post the news
There isn’t enough going on to make it every day matter.
Lol imagine demanding this from somebody else who does all the work.
Source?
Interesting statement by Tatarigami https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1710382234803290154?s=20
He does not observe a lag of Russian reserves. It seems that the current Russian mobilization scheme is enough to keep the defense up. The considerably raised def. Russian budget for 24 (sry!) may allow for another bigger mobilization. I would guess that this would be done by mobilizing those that come
out of their conscription cycle. Right now it seems that those are just asked to sign contracts. Anyone with more information on current mobilization in Russia?
There is no new mobilisation. There is an enrolment for a contract of willing conscripts. There is a lot of money there, and there are a lot of people willing. Accordingly, the number of soldiers at the front is growing. This method has been used since the beginning of the year.
So there is no ‘micro’ mobilization ongoing? Seems strange that new laws are past for something, which is not happening at all.
The new laws were enacted in the toughest possible version for possible future mobilisation. The last mobilisation revealed a lot of mistakes, stupidity and idiocy.
Thx for the input.
The so-called “volunteers” ARE the mobilized men.
If you don’t remember, before september 2022, Putin was already promising a lot of money to all the people willing to sign a contract. Almost nobody signed a contract.
But since the mobilization, they got a lot of “volunteers”.
If you want to understand Russia, first you must learn to understand the subtext and the lies.
Do you live in Russia? Wow, I didn’t know. Well, once again, there is a biannual draft in the country. Of those drafted, a certain number of them go into contract service. The money for it exceeds the average salary by about four or five times. Is that clearer?
Of those drafted, most of them are coerced into contract service. The money is one thing. The high risk of getting killed or injured means many of them won’t enjoy the money. But their mommy will get a new Lada! Or a bag of potatoes.
Well, do you live in Russia?
contract service in the Russian Federation is used as a social elevator; the difference in salary between work in non-Moscow and contract service is huge (3-10x depending on the region). Now this method is used instead of the extremely unpopular mobilization of everyone. As far as I know, summonses for mobilization are not sent out, only invitations to serve as it was in the summer of 2022
Thx for the input.
this is the same what any reasonable and competent person was telling for month. There is a substantial lack of forces to man the whole defense line structures but that does not mean that they are undefended. Or that they are ‘piece of cake’. Setting surrealistic expectation hurts the effort – nobody ‘will be home on Christmass’.
As I said – I doubt that there will be –>
–> any ‘mobilisation’ (until something dramatic happen).
Trickling the troops piecemeal (they are not rotated so guys are dumped in Ukraine without intention of taking them for a relief) seems to be ‘good enough’ for RU. For now.
Well, there were vertical redeployments and a deployment of a division that is barely ready. Anyways, so let’s say Russia has a contingency plan in place and has the money and the laws to mobilize for a considerable increase in troops after Putin reelection next year. If I would be him, I would just stay put and see what happens in the USA.
New bad news: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/dramatic-increase-in-dprk-russia-border-rail-traffic-after-kim-putin-summit/ We might see an increase in Russian artillery activity given that NK is now supplying it.
or increased number of accidents. The quality may be problematic.
It is not good development (though – not unexpected) but also not a reason for a panic.
Ok, no Russian economics anymore, even though I would like to point to the fact that those will likely influence the battlefield more in the years to come than many other things.
How about war economics, like 155 mm ramp up in the west?
Economics are ok if you connect it to the development on the ground.
The RU economy still exists, it is too big to die so quickly.But the problems there are very serious, from the lack of workers in all areas to the budget deficit. Bureaucracy is strangling the system itself from within.The problems are indicated by the statements of officials that the RU has the strength to continue the war throughout 2024. I consider this an offer of negotiation and a threat in 1