The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the recent developments on the battlefield, as of 23rd September 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time).
Sloboda Front
includes the area of between Oskil and Aydar river
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Siverskyi Donets
overview map of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut and Lysychansk vicinity
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Bilohorivka
Bakhmut Front
includes the vicinity of Bakhmut
- Russian artillery targeted Ukrainian forces north of Andriivka near the railway, revealing the enemy retreated behind the railway. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Klishchiivka
Avdiivka Front
includes the vicinity of Avdiivka
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Donetsk Front
includes the center and southern part of Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- Marinka, Pobieda
Zaporizhzhia Front
includes the Zaporizhzhia Oblast
- Ukrainian forwarded element entered and was ambushed on the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka. Nevertheless, it shows further Ukrainian advance towards the settlement. (source)
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Kherson Front
includes the left bank of Dnipro river south of Kherson and Kakhovka
Ukrainian General Staff reports repelled attacks in the vicinity of:
- No activity reported.
Full map of Ukraine
overview map of current situation in Ukraine
This summary and detailed maps are based on the following sources:
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, official media channels of Ukrainian regional administrations, Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and geolocated footage.
We also thank the following Twitter users for their geolocations and amazing work: @neonhandrail, @auditor_ya and the team at @geoconfirmed.
Do you like our summaries, follow Twitter daily and have interest in geolocations? I’m looking for volunteers to help me to monitor the situation and write the summaries with me. If you are interested, please contact us via email [email protected].
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Mentioned Units |
No unit mentioned.
Big losses for Russia in what seems to have been a (foiled) counterattack towards Urozhaine
Source?
I can’t find any recent news about Urozhaine.
This message was deleted by administrator. Please follow the discussion rules.
Please provide source next time you post such information.
I just had a prelimanary look at the September losses or Russia. There will be a shattering next new record in artillery systems destroyed and it it will be the lowest personnel losses of the year. Together with the vertical redeployment of those two VDV divisions to Tokmak and the “rumored” deployment of a new unit that cannot be finished with its constitution to the Bakhmut area, it really seems
like Russia is running out of people to throw into the fight. Meanwhile Ukraine insists it isn´t done yet for this fighting season, but it seems to have given up the Berdiansk axis aswell. Let´s see what round 10, october, will bring, but it does feel like Russia is longing for the winter break, while Ukraine wants to fight 12 rounds.
To slecify a bit: Russia lossing much towed art, SP, mlrs and sam. Ukraine IFV, helis in September (Oryx).
Btw., I read something interesting on social media, the trend is supposed to be going to mortars and towed artillery, because they are easier to hide and less expensive than self propelled artillery. This just a rumor, but it sounds like a rational answer to the drone problem. In general big expensive systems seem to have a problem. Tanks, Planes, IFVs, Ships…
For Jérome (and others who may also be interested): on Twitter, @Stevius21 records all the heavy equipment of the Ukrainian brigades:
https://twitter.com/Stevius21/status/1707138329295360351
Something not talked of very often, but just to look at this mess of different gear gives me the goose bumps concerning the gigantic feat Ukraines logistic handles. It is a wonder to behold that Ukraine manages to keep its war machine running. I hope i will get old enough to get my hands on a good book that explains how on earth they managed this.
However, many vehicles are missing from the graphic… bridge-laying tanks, mine clearing vehicles, PZH2000, Gepard, the French and Swedish artillery tanks…
With enough fuel, this isn’t a major logistical challenge, considering that the vehicles come into the country by train and on the road within the country itself. The only challenge is to protect the convoys of vehicles from air attacks.
I dunno how with Leopards Abrams and PZH but on the older machines track tension, track and wheel conditional repair (the crew job) was every 20-50km (in the ‘combat conditions’). Stuff breaks. Shit happens. All the fuel in the World won’t help you if your mechanics or electronics are broken. And ofc. you need to transport that fuel too.
So, yeah.That will be an interesting material.
at least 12 main tank types, 49 variants,not all of them made home in UA, some of them not even exchangeable with parts, due to optics, barrels, protective armor, diesel, some turbine, thats tank alone, not SPG,APC,IFV. Sure, it must be piece of cake to logistically support all that. As well when during war you have apx. 25% inoperable due to losses, maintenance or various repairs.
Changing the chain and adjusting the chain tension is part of the driver’s standard training.
When I was in the Bundeswehr, we used a sledgehammer to get the engine running again on a defective M113. There was a terrible smell of gasoline while we were driving, but the flap at the top was simply left open.
And if the Leopard was defective, the replacement engine was simply taken from the Buffalo recovery vehicle, which it always carries on the back. If two Leos are defective, you remove the correct engine from the recovery tank and the Leo or take at least a few parts of it. That’s the advantage of Western tanks, the same platform is used by several vehicle classes.
In Germany, 100 armored vehicles are maneuvered through city centers with many residents to the train station for a combat bivouac. Or when the Americans move their units in Germany again, the highway is full for 2 km. What armed forces are really good at is transporting armored units through town and country without causing damage.
The transport of the equipment to the frontline is not the problem. The problem is to keep it running and fed with munitions during war, not to mention the personnel. And we are not talking about a golf here, but complicated gear and quasi everything from NATO and Sovjet time. You need the right tools, the knowledge, the right screws, the right munition, oil, fuels, etc.
Or to give an idea how much work stands behind 1 soldier on the Frontline, the USA calculates with 2 enabling him to fight on. Ukraine and Russia will have more.
But every company has an instant appointment for this. They are in the background as a support company or as a staff together with those at the front. And there are usually people working there who know something about their craft. And it may be hard to believe, but a tank is easier to repair than a car or truck.
A tank fills up with diesel, the same as trucks. But of course the logistics units have to do a lot, but one should assume that it works and can handle such a large war.
As rule, at least a third of a company is responsible for logistics and supplies. However, you almost never see these people in the videos and pictures because otherwise you would give away your command center and main positions
MA10A pressed ‘dislike’ (on the mention about diesel).
We’re much more up-to-date, and I spotted several mistakes in his graphics.
Another good analysis of the Ukrainian strategy of attrition, with historical insight:
https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting-off-what-it-can-chew-ukraine-understands-its-attritional-context/
Very interesting article. I never knew what to think of the WWI analogies used befor. To read that Ukraine is using a WWI allied tactical strategy, developed against a German elastic defense, against the elastic defense of Russia is enlighting. Two lessons i would draw out of it: 1) We have to settle into the thought of a long atrittional Phase and 2) we should finally give Ukraine all they want.
But that is not the future of war. There are now state-of-the-art weapon systems that can make a battle like this completely different. The problem is the Russians, who have either learned nothing in all their decades of wars or simply don’t want to, forcing a battle of attrition. After all, that’s exactly how they did it in previous wars.
Their doctrine is to cause a lot of damage in a country or part of a country and not to leave this destroyed area. They are creatures of habit without great demands. In Russia, most soldiers live in run-down, dilapidated houses and do so in the occupied territories. Dirt, destruction, no water, no electricity awakens a feeling of home in them.
Hello,
you have to live without summary tonight. Next one on Saturday as usual. Thanks
Hi,
in fact, I’ll be fine with only 1 summary/week. Frontlines are mostly static anyways (despite the intense shelling and fighting).
No problem!
ISW:
“The United States should embrace its partnership with a competent ally that will also provide leadership…”
Wow, steep thesis… What this means is that for the first time the USA has a partner (UKR) who is a leader on the battlefield and has more experience and is therefore on a par with the USA.
It is also important to maintain the dynamic of the offensive in winter. So the Russians don’t have time to regroup. The Russians are most vulnerable when they have to constantly adapt to new situations under pressure and have no time for strategic planning.
The RU sluggishness has been this way since the beginning of the invasion. The central command structure prevents quick decisions being made
Tom Cooper’s take on the slow pace of the Ukrainian offensive:
https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-26-september-2023-the
It’s maybe a little bit too optimistic, but I think he makes some good points.
its not the opimism that is the problem. The writing style of the blog is something reminiscent of fanfiction. How can you take it serious? But there some good points made, but damn. Unreadable!
I don’t care about the writing style. I care about information and analysis, that is what he provides.
Well, Max was supplying with attrition comments weeks ago, esp in counterbattery. Article was refreshing in style, but less with new info and I dare to say inflamed statemens eg “3 VDV regiments non-existent”. I think its worth still observe and wait for further confirmation or information, stay rather conservative than optimistic.
Well, I was explaining the attrition and counter-battery strategy already early July.
His information:
And the conclusion of his analysis: the Ukrainian offensive is going far better than the media are saying, even f it doesn’t show on the maps.
Here some points to ponder:
1) if I look at my list of ukrainian brigades, I don’t see much reserves either.
2) Ukrainians themselves just set the goal to taking tokmak minimum, at current paces that’s still far away.
3) Oryx numbers favor Ukraine only slightly in the south, more so in artillery, but still…
4) we don’t know how much more artillery attrition Russia can take, may be a lot
5) we know that oryx gets a lot more Infos from the ukrainian side, what bias may this entail?
6) Russian personnel losses reported by Ukraine are a lot lower than during their offensive.
7) I don’t mind patience at current parameters, but there are elections in the USA next year…
The trend right now is Ukraines friend, no doubt in me. Not sure about time though and the counteroffensive is
still far from its minimum goal.
We’ll see.
Tom Cooper bases his analysis on OSINT sources but also on unconfirmed information he get from Ukrainian/Russian sources (“RUMINT”). This make his less reliable but allows him to see/say trends that may be covered by the fog of war.
From what I’ve heard there howitzer are the artillery version of an AK and so affordable they can be left in a variety of positions unused but prepared and sited for certain situations such as if they loose a trench they already have a couple aimed at those positions without having to redirect other pieces.
Good for you, my point was, its nothing new on recent basis. Quickly react- you may have second brigade, still may not be enough to cover larger portion of the front, only double the fire missions and you can still lack ammo for eg. suppression fire and hence usage can be limited. Russian losses are approximated, hard to argue with that point. You mean strategic reserve (eg 25th CAA army depl)?
oryx reports Arty attr. 2:1 favoring AFU, so they have losses to replace too, again, can influence efficiency, hard to estimate real ratio. Russia still may chose to redeploy from Kup, Avd, Bachmut as short fix, if we talk about Orichiv axis and ignoring the rest of the front. Rosgvardia alone should have 400k, do they need them all to defend the state home? We will see more after Solodka balka.
i am optimistic, that AFU will kick them out eventually, i just dont know when, between being pushed out and front collapse and quick withdrawals is pretty plenty options taking time and despite the analysis, its only guessing.
It is pretty much always the same tune by most positive analysis: Ukraine is destroying the Russian military and eventually it will win. The same tune I keep repeating. Very comforting was, even Oberst Reisner, not known for his optimism, believes Ukraine has very good chances at current support level. Does it destroy the Russian military faster than the West, USA, reduces it’s support though?
For UKR, Tokmak is the minimum destination because Melitopol can only be reached via Tokmak. Melitopol is and remains the UKR’s big goal in this phase. Because only from there can Crimea be reconquered at some point.
Russia will never lose the war. This will be ended beforehand by the Russians. This is the only sensible way out for Russia if it faces defeat.
‘Losing the war’ is a question of definition. Russia already faced defeat concerning the destruction of the ukrainian state and increasing it’s sphere of influence into former Soviet or east block states, which actually shrinks. Russia is also getting considerably weaker with every year it keeps this up. The only strategic goals left is the land corridor, weakening Ukraine further and saving
at least some face and if those are gone also, it can still just simply not accept defeat, like it allready did concerning the former goals. Strategically Russia has lost this war mostly already. Vast parts of Ukraine ar part of the West and Russia is weaker and lost a lot of influence.
Winning or losing is just a matter of your own interpretation and definition.
Actually, there will be no winners in this war. The Russians don’t because they caused too much damage to their military and country and the Ukraine doesn’t because there is too much war damage, scorched earth and traumatized people left in the end.
Partial victories is perhaps a better term for UKR
It’s a waste of time to even discuss such articles because the same thing is written everywhere. The only difference is the choice of words and the writing style of the authors. Everything else has been read everywhere for months because the same events have been discussed for six months. Just so that everyone can claim to have said the same thing six months ago?
General Tarnavsky, head of the southern ukrainian operations, stated that tokmak is the minimum goal for this counteroffensive. That would very likely entail prolonging the counteroffensive deep into the mud season… It also does provides us with an official benchmark to measure the counteroffensive. The road thru Verbove could open a new attack path to the south east for this endeavour.
He also states that he believes that a larger retreat or breakthrough could happen once tokmak falls. We are certainly not there yet, but to me it feels like we may be moving into another bakhmut story here.
I dont know Max, starting to feels like “Mobilize now or not to Mobilize and miss the right moment” on Russian side of the front. Unless there is R psy op running, telegram is bit panicking about at least two points on the front. Attrition without rotation does not work well for R. Seem theyre desperately looking for mud season to catch a breath and repeat fall22.
Basically, it’s not even difficult to overcome the Russian defense lines if the Russians in front of them are decimated. They’re so stupid that they operate in front of the defense line instead of behind it. A defensive position only lasts as long as soldiers protect it. And you don’t do that when you’re standing in front of it.
Tarnavsky says that they have to clear every tree line and then there are more fortifications and more mines. I just think that even if Ukraine has the resources to keep this up it will still take long to clear all that and the mud won’t make it easier. May be Russia will have to fall back to a prepared line, that would make it quicker. The ‘tokmak’ campaign is 3 months old now…
Concerning mobilization: The conscript cycles end in fall and spring, I think October and April, if they draft all of those they have an influx of about 100k that could be trained for a year every half a year. And I think they started conscripting 125k this year. If you add in a couple k ‘covered’ mobilized and volunteers a month you get to 300k a year quickly. May be another wave in winter
Next conscription cycle can be drafted about now. If you add some mobilized and volunteers Russia can have about 300k new man easily a year. May be they plan a small mobilization in winter for 24, the budget can pay it. The conscription went up from 110k to 125k, that should also kick in next year. I think training and equipment are probably the bigger problem than people.
Conscription cycles end and start in fall and spring, October and April I think.
I know about option, I hope I am not wrong, but news were saying R tried conscripts to make kontraktniki 3-6 months after the draft, therefore Oct-Nov draft should not help unless they change the habit (hence partial mobilization last year in the autumn with 300k extra). I know there is parallel stream to hire 400k for whole 2023, have nothing else than R claiming 240k reached already.
Ah, interesting, I thought the conscripted just get their mobilization papers after the 1 year term is over. So may be they will mobilize those who didn’t sign earlier now? Would make more sense than mobilizing people that haven’t been in service for a while. That is what I would do know if I would be them…
The max age of conscripts was raised this year. Previously military service was from 18-27 years, now it is up to 30 years. In addition as student you are no longer exempt from compulsory military service; chronic illnesses are no longer a reason for being decommissioned. Notices of convocation are now being sent digitally.This means that once it has been sent digitally, it is considered delivered
Until last year, these notices were sent by registered mail and were only considered delivered if the recipient received them in person. And anyone who has such a notice is no longer allowed to leave the country. As of this year, anyone who misses the call-up must expect a high penalty.
These are the reasons why the number of conscripts has suddenly increased.
You can no longer hide, buy your freedom, study, go to another country etc.
But what still applies is that as long as compulsory military service lasts (1 year) you will not be deployed in wars. So no conscript may be assigned to military service. However, after 1 year of compulsory military service, you automatically become a reservist and are then sent to war. Newly trained soldiers are better
So are finished conscripts all mobilized after their service allready?
i know about 1y service, my speculation point was this: “as drafted soldiers are the main source of contracted servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces. In this way, the new law allows the drafted soldiers to sign short-term contracts (for one year or less instead of the typical two-year contracts) for military service in combat zones after one month of service.” They coerce conscripts to sign.
Another source for the topic: “The only service personnel legally permitted to deploy outside the territory of the Russian Federation are the professional officer and warrant officer classes, and the so-called kontraktniki (‘contract soldiers’) who sign three year contracts.”
https://wavellroom.com/2022/09/23/russias-conscripts-problem/
We already know that conscripts were sent to Ukraine, in violation of the law, during the initial invasion. If Russian command didn’t follow those laws then, why would anyone think they’re following them now?
Because Putin personally ordered the conscripts back and punished the officers responsible.
Putin’s big concern is the discontent of the families of conscripts. It is a different matter to send voluntary or contract soldiers into a war than to send young people who are inadvertently involved simply because they are completing compulsory military service. Not even Russia violates this law.
one word: ‘elections’.
They are silently mobilizing all the time but big mobilisation run (like the last one) would be possible before the elections only if smth. happens at the Kharkiv level of disaster for RU. Until then they will do nothing more than usual.
Do you mean the presidential election next year? The regional elections are over, I think.
yes Putin’s reelection. It has no value as we usually understand ‘the election’ – it’s more of a plebiscite and showing the level of support from populous and particular players, it also shows the level of control over the beaurocracy. Regardless of the outcome Putin won’t resign ofc. but depending of it the internal tactics and strategy of the regime core will change.
I don’t know. Waiting with a big mobilization wave until after disaster strikes, is asking for it. Doesn’t seem like a logical strategy, but hey, it is the Kremlin.
as many you seems ignoring intricate way how the war is driven by internal RU politics. Basically there is constant struggle in Kremlin to keep populous disengaged and willing at the same time, which is not an easy feat. ‘Solution’ for that is an attempt to militarise the youth, so they will be indoctrinated well enough to die for the Tzar in the coming decades.
Why wasn’t that Ukrainian soldier at least hiding behind the wall? He was just out there in the open asking to be sniped or ambushed.
Quote of Jerome from the last report:
“Keep it relevant means your comment should be relevant to the article you comment.”
I thought about what this means concerning these articles covering “the recent developments on the battlefield”. Until now I interpreted relevance as anything that is part of this war. To say that Russian budget planing is relevant concerning the recent developments on the
battlefield is probably a stretch to far. I will refrain from that. These articles do not cover Navy or deep strike operations, but they are “recent battlefiele operations”… Any thoughts on this by the community?
Yes, off topic discussion should be directed to our Discord server.
Reuters with a report on Russian budget plans: Another big surge in defense and classified spending financed in part by cutting the national wealth fund by half, which would be empty at that speed by the end of 25. Factor in that munitions are running low and sovjet hard ware stocks are emptying fast, we can savely assume that all Russian financial and production reserves will depleted no later
than 2026. If I would be Ukraine and the West, that would be my minimum planing horizon in this war of attrition. It seems that planers in Moscow think that the current war effort is not enough. They will be able to finance a lot more personal along that planing line, how much more production is also a question of how much import at the weaker Rubel they need.
A link: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/23/7421112/
The defense and classified budgets are supposed to go up by something like 60-70 percent.
What is national welth fund and how it accumulate money? Why the US doesn’t have one?
The media said they were running out from munitions, rocket and will since middle of last year, why do you think it is different this time?
The NWF of Russia is called a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Several US states have such funds (the combined value of which exceeds Russia’s NWF). It’s really not *that* much money. China, Singapore, Norway, and several Middle East countries hold the bulk of global assets classified as SWFs.
USA doesn’t have a national wealth fund, it has a national debt. “Why” is a question we could debate all year, and anyway it’s off-topic.
I have no idea if Max’s numbers are accurate. I do know this: if it comes down to a manufacturing race between Russia and N Korea on one side, and USA, EU, UK, Canada, Australia, S Korea on the other side, then the results aren’t hard to predict.
Sovereign wealth funds are not related to national debt. The Russians used the fund early in the war to stabilize the stock prices of Russian companies and provide them capital to continue operations. Max is claiming that Russia will be digging into the fund again to boost defense production and procurement.
Again, it is Reuters claiming that: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-plans-26-rise-budget-spending-2024-2023-09-22/
And Reuters ‘claims’ to cite Russian officials.
The numbers are from the Russian budget plan for 24 as reported by Reuters. Concerning Russian gear, stocks and production, Perun, YouTube, is my benchmark.
Russia is lying… Before the war, almost 80% of export revenues came from oil and gas. Now the export of other goods should suddenly be twice as high as oil and gas? Russia cannot have improved its inferior products so much in two years that they suddenly generate so much revenue. No country buys Russian products (except military, oil and gas).
The economy outside the military industry is in ruins and completely ailing.
The only reason can only be that they are selling off their oil and gas even cheaper than expected.
What is a production reserve and how do you accumulate porduction reserve?
The financial reserves doesn’t seem to be shrinking but growing, how is it they will run out?
With the production reserves I meant the stocks of heavy gear and munitions produced in the past. With financial reserves I meant the NWF of Russia. We know that barrel munitions have a shelf life, we know that Russia is shooting a lot less than last year and we know that Russia is buying munitions as much as it can. Concerning heavy gear there are satellite images where you can see how
the stores shrink and there are people who actually count. Unkown is how good the condition of those left is. Thise stocks did shrink a lot across the board. Concerning munitions I would hold any bet that they are depleted by 26, may be not all rocket munitions, they have a longer shelf life. May be Russia will still try to scrap rests of gear together but it will be super outdated and cumbersome.
What you write is all just speculation. Russia has enough ammunition to keep the war going for several more years. The problem for the Russians is that they cannot send their ammunition to the front because the Ukrainians are destroying them. A huge amount of ammunition is still stored on Russian territory. The fact that half of them are outdated and unusable are just unproven assumptions.
Due to air superiority, Russia continues to have advantages in the use of cruise missiles and rockets.
There is also real evidence that Russia buys ammunition from other countries. The only real thing is that they import an incredible amount of drones. But the fact that there is ammunition among them is a rumor. First of all, the ammunition has to be suitable for the Russian guns.
And it will still be months before North Korea starts delivering. Which country that is not part of the former Soviet Union supplies Russia with ammunition????
One should not forget that RU has switched to a war economy. This means that commercial manufacturers also produce weapons parts for the military industry. The required foreign components come directly into the country through smuggling and bypassing sanctions. So one could assume that RU is absolutely capable of producing enough ammunition. Whether these also reach the front is another mather
Why buy artillery munitions from Iran and north Korea if you produce more than you can transport? Makes no sense to me…
In the end it is a educated guess, or speculation. You speculate than can produce what they need indefinitely, I doubt that. There are estimates that Russia used 11 million in the first year and 7 million in this year. Production is supposed to be at 2 million at best.
The national Welth Fund has nothing to do with reserves. It accumulate money usually from surplus. That is why asked you the question. US runs on trillions of deficit that is why they don’t have welth fund.
Russian shell production is more than double that of combined NATO.
Financial reserves last year November sat at $550b May this year was at $600b.
NATO will produce the roughly same amount of artillery shells as Russia next year. It outproduce a Russia in precision munitions with ease now and in the future.
It may be that the West has more precision ammunition, but what is supplied to the UKR is not sufficient. To truly surpass RU, NATO would have to deliver at least five times more missiles and ammunition than they have so far. In addition, both warring parties are relying more and more on drones, and RU has a lot of them, simply because Iran gives almost its entire stockpile to the Russians
I don’t know where you get your information from. But the fact is that before the war Russia had over 20 million artillery shells. They shot 10-15 million in the entire war, so there’s still 5 million left. Germany delivered just 25,000 artillery shells to the UKR during the entire war. If production increased, the West would be able to deliver a maximum of 100,000 shells per month.
which would give 1,2M a year, that wouldnt be that bad, but 100k a month is like 2027 or rather 2028 and latter, if im not mistaken about claimed calculations. Drone war will arrive sooner, im afraid.
The US claims to reach 100k per month in 25 and the EU wants to reach 1 million next year. The Russian numbers are all speculations or educated guesses, but even Kays show that Russia will run out of stocks before 26, which was my original claim. If Russia burnt 15 million of 20 million shells in 18 months and considering that it is losing ground since month 6…
sorry Max, was working with outdated data (24k in 22, 40k by end of 23 in USA). Neither party will run out of shells (eg 1 or 2M a year vs 3M a year as example), but the decrease in fires density will impact R on attack, even crippling the effort, not mentioning their accuracy and range is falling behind UA capabilities (not overall, but trend is there already visible). Dont see R out of… Read more »
The deficiency in the UKR can be seen in the fact that last week RUS carried out 500 air strikes with rockets and grenades, while the UKR carried out 80 attacks.
If Germany delivers TAURUS, there will only be a maximum of 100 because only 150 are ready for use. Germany has a total of 600 TAURUS, which RU fires in a week.
The stocks of Scalp and Stormshadow are very deep, that is of the normal 500 km variant. They started of with shirt ranged Export Typ. Other than in artillery munitions, NATO still has a lot more stuff. The point is, they do not want to give it and Ukraine is already doing pretty good with what they get. Germany had nothing in store, but Rheinmetall is one of the biggest artillery producer out
there. Once Russians stocks are depleted, which will come for sure, it will be a production race and if that is a 2 million shells 2 million shels thing, I know who I would bet on. Ukraine had a lot less shells than Russia for most of the war.
Rheinmetall can’t produce as much as some people would like. According to the website, several hundred thousand artillery shells will be delivered by 2029. This year UKR will receive 40,000 cartridges for the cheetah. A total of 300,000 will be produced. Considering that the Cheetah has a rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute and there are over 40 Cheetahs deployed in the UKR…
Unfortunately, the reality is that the UKR will also suffer from a shortage of ammunition. And as long as the West does not switch to a war economy, it will stay that way.
Last but not least, they have delivered 10,000 rounds of artillery ammunition so far. The maximum quantity is just 100,000… With the other producers we can calculate the whole number by 10. We’ll stay with a maximum of 2-3 million over several years.
There is also the issue of having the barrels for so many shells. I think the West, that includes buying shells from Asia, can reach 3 million by 25 easily with a million more with a decision lag of a year thereafter. I think it was Rheinmetall that just opened a factory in Australia that produces 100k a year alone… Many numbers out there, we will see.
Russian shell production is double than Nato and was even more before the war, plus 17M stock shell, and here are we today, when they fired 13M shells and have less teritorry than a year ago, and NATO have not even arrived. Dont you see the absurdity of that? I can see why. US supplies (country in debt as you say), its fraction of the budget did more than whole Russia on steroids.
Sovereign wealth funds have nothing to do with national debt. Several US states partially fund their primary and secondary education with one. Please… just Google the concept.
I gave you the chance to check for yourself when I asked you the questions.
The issue is you operate on wishfull thinking.
What you are revering to are foreign exchange reserves. That is not a financial reserve as you interpret it. I can’t be bothered to explain this here, but to use it for e.g. the budget, the central bank would need print rubles or find another way to balance it’s books. FX reserves are interesting for currency stability, that’s it. The USA for example has endless dollar reserves, they can print it.
But yes, my wording was not very exact. That doesn’t change that FX reserves do not represent any wealth.
You can’t print endlessly, because you inflate the currency. Jesus man, seriously?
That’s not his point.
hes just another troll like cul de sac, hes nitpicking and reacting only to things he can make doubtful. No reaction to other things. Illogical connotations that makes little to no sense when put together.
Im not sure why you wishes based solely on Wealth Fund. USSR spent appx 20% GDP before collapse, Russia exceeded 10% this year. Has no vassals to plunder like it did back in time. Economy is 2 times smaller than in USSR, west remained the same or even expanded. Production of military is not up to replacing losses. Other goods production dropping due to shift to military. Enjoy the path…
That’s correct. That’s why RU reintroduced barter. So you’re back in the Middle Ages… RU gives away or sells off oil, gas and food and in return receives military items.
But it won’t work out well in the long term because there are no financial resources. If you give each other something, you still don’t have any money.
But RU doesn’t seem to mind at first because it has enough options to cut spending and reallocate funds. Social, infrastructure, wages… Russia is sinking into poverty and rotting technologically, but the main thing is that the war chest is full.
R is delusional remnant of former superpower from bipolar world era trying to be perceived bigger than it is, having nothing to offer (USSR had at least ideology) for its sympathizers but money, corruption and free fall from window. You said it well Kay, i share the opinion too.
Have the Russians given up trying to recapture Kupyansk? What about the Russian units that were moved there in August? Looks like the front in Luhansk is frozen
It seems that the main purpose of the activity near Kupyansk was to draw reserves away from the Zaporozhye direction. In general, the Russians chose the tactic of exhausting the enemy in the offensive. Otherwise they had to suffer the same losses in the offensive
“In general, the Russians chose the tactic of exhausting the enemy in the offensive.”‘
no. The stupid order to immediatly counterattack on each lost position is still central in russian “strategy”. They exchange lives for time.
Each days, russian send stupid unprepared counterattack .
Yes the big 100 k russian offensiv was only (without any surprise) a 10k offensiv . They distact a few part of ukr reserves.
They keep attacking and losing. Might be a diversionary effort, but cross-reference the maps with the brigade entries and it’s pretty clear that Ukraine is mostly using newer units in that area. This lets them gain experience. Moscow has committed both newer and older formations, the latter including 1st Guard Tank Army, theoretically a high-quality formation. Theoretically.