425th Regiment’s Costly Counterattack Near Pokrovsk

On March 31, 2026, the 425th Assault Regiment, supported by elements of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, launched a counterattack along highway E50 toward Pokrovsk in an attempt to retake a previously lost position considered vital to the area’s defense. The regiment moved under the cover of fog, but the armored column was caught by Russian drones and struck as the assault group was unloading.

The Counterattack

Serhiy Sternenko — Ukrainian blogger and advisor to the Minister of Defense — publicly criticized the leadership of the 425th Assault Regiment over the assault on March, which resulted in the loss of equipment and soldiers.

“We often laugh at the enemy when he sends columns to attack — in conditions of total drone dominance, columns become easy targets and the enemy pays heavily. But what do we make of Ukrainian commanders who do the same? The footage shows the wreckage of the 425th Regiment’s equipment near Pokrovsk. I will not post footage of our soldiers’ bodies. Sadly, there is plenty of it. It is a crime to treat our people this way. And for that, there must be accountability,” Sternenko wrote.

The regiment’s leadership reacted swiftly and publicly, accusing Sternenko of assessing the unit’s actions based on Russian-sourced footage, and insisting the Pokrovsk operation was a success achieved with minimal losses.

“Soldiers of the regiment execute the order to defend positions in the city of Pokrovsk. On March 31, the regiment conducted a successful counterattack on one of the key tactical objects in Pokrovsk. During the counterattack, enemy drones struck four units of our armored equipment already near the attack site. The assault group successfully landed and completed the task, and at the moment continues to lead the battle at the assigned object. Our casualties in battle were two soldiers,” reads the regiment’s офіційна заява.

To further demonstrate its weight, a battalion of the regiment assembled for a public address against Sternenko — M2 Bradleys lined up prominently in the background. The optics were striking, but the decision was deeply reckless. Such a gathering violates Ukrainian law on public assemblies of military personnel. Had the enemy detected and struck it, the result could have been dozens of casualties — all for the sake of a show of force. It is difficult to describe it as anything other than a serious lapse in judgment.

A Service Check is Underway

The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps, responsible for operations in the Pokrovsk area, said on April 1 that a formal investigation has been opened into the operation.

“These actions are studied and investigated by higher military command. A service check is underway,” the statement reads.

TSN journalist Yulia Kiriyenko subsequently spoke with the regiment’s chief of staff, who acknowledged that the battle resulted in the loss of an M1117 armored vehicle — which led the column and served as a mine-clearing platform — an M1 Abrams tank, and two BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. A third IFV, which was last vehicle of the group moved in and successfully evacuated the crews of the damaged vehicles. As seen on a drone footage below, there are indeed no dead crew members around destroyed vehicles.

The Aftermath

Questions linger over whether it was worth committing an armored group and infantry to recover already-lost positions near Pokrovsk at all — whether those resources might have been better preserved for a more meaningful operation elsewhere. That said, given the favorable weather conditions the regiment attempted to exploit, Ukraine has seen far worse attempts to claw back lost ground. This was not the most reckless decision made on this front.

It is also somewhat selective to single out the 425th Assault Regiment for this particular assault, while the same unit routinely conducts attacks on motorbikes and ATVs in other sectors — operations with survival rates that do not bear thinking about. If there is accountability to be handed out, the commanders ordering those missions ought to be standing at the front of the line. Literally.

The more important point, however, is structural. Assault regiments operate under the direct command of Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Sirskyi. He micromanages these units, and it is entirely plausible — likely, even — that the order for this attack came from him personally. It is Sirskyi who has dragged the Ukrainian Army back toward Soviet-style warfare, who has elevated loyalty above competence, and who has cultivated an increasingly authoritarian atmosphere within the Armed Forces. The cycle of costly assaults to retake overrun positions, packaged into tidy reports bound for President Zelenskyy’s desk, has been a recognizable pattern since the defense of Bakhmut in 2022.

Blame for the 425th’s losses near Pokrovsk does not begin and end with the regiment. It begins considerably higher up.